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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In Orr v. Walker the court correctly held that a contract
may be avoided because of fraud practiced by the other party
although no pecuniary loss is involved. Article 1847 of the Civil
Code, relied upon as authority, is clear to the point.
In Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc.,6 the court concluded that
a demand for triple damages under the state and federal anti-
trust laws was not contractual or quasi-contractual in nature
bUt sounded in tort and was subject to a prescription period of
one year.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
SALES
The degree of care required in the formulation of legislation
is amatter of common knowledge. Even greater care is required
to translate accurately legislative provisions from their original
language into another. That the person or persons who trans-
lated the Louisiana Civil Code from French into English were
wanting in this respect is also a matter of common knowledge.
Some expressions of the court in Zemurray v. Boe1 seem ques-
tionable, perhaps for this reason. Creole, a land developer, paid
$500 for a two-year option to purchase certain acreage from the
plaintiff. The exercise of the option was subjected to the condi-
tion that on or before a stated date Creole pay or buy a note of
a third party held by the plaintiff. This Creole failed to do,
hence the present suit to cancel the option notwithstanding that
the note was paid in full prior to the expiration of the option
period. After a painstaking review of the complicated evidence,
the majority of the court found no basis for holding the plaintiff
estopped to claim that the option had terminated for failure, of
the condition. A dissent took the contrary view. Although the
ultimate disposition of the case turned on the matter of estoppel,
in rejecting a contention that the option was not forfeited since
Creole had not been put in default, a prerequisite to an action in
resolution, the majority opinion took the position that the pur-
chase or payment of the mentioned note within the stated period
5. 236 La. 740, 109 So.2d 77 (1959).
6. 237 La. 132, 110 So.2d 553 (1959).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
-1. 2.35 La. 623, 105 So.2d 243 (1958).
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Was a suspensive condition which prevented the ."initiation" -of.
any obligation on the part of plaintiff under the option. There-
fore,, it was explaihed, since the payment could not be counted
as iesolutory in nature, a putting in default was not required as
a prerequisite to cancellation of the option. Although the conclu-
sion is sound, the stated effect of a suspensive condition seems
incorrect. Article 2021 of the Civil Code, quoted by the court,
lends color to its position, but the true meaning of the provision
appears to have been distorted in its translation from ,the
French. The English version reads in part: "If the obligation
is not to take effect until the event happen, it is a suspensive
condition." A more exact rendition of the French would be:
"The obligation is conditional when it is made to depend on a
future and uncertain event, either by suspending it until the
arrival of the event .... "2 The French version seems to make it
clear that the obligation exists but is merely suspended pending
the happening of the event, 3 whereas the English suggests that
there is no obligation until the event happens. This latter. view
was taken by the court. Pretermitting, however, a comparison
of the English and French versions, a more accurate as well as
positive provision to the contrary is found in Article 2028. It
recognizes specifically that the obligee has a right of which the
obligor cannot deprive him, although its exercise is suspended.
In the law of contract the proper use of the term "condition" is
in reference to an event on which the performance but not the
existence of a duty depends, in which event it is a suspensive
condition or condition precedent. For example, a promise to sell
one's house if the promisor is transferred to Mamou given in
return for a promise to buy it in such event, gives rise to a bind-
ing bilateral contract. Neither party is privileged to withdraw
pending the occurrence of the condition ; the rights under the con-
tract are transmissible and date from the date of the contract ;4
they may be preserved by recordation; they may be alienated or
mortgaged ;5 and their possessor may take conservatory meas-
2. CODE CIVIL art. 1168: "L'obligation est conditionelle loraqu'on la fait dpen-
dre, d'un 6vdnement jutur et.incertain, soit en la suspendant jusqu'd ce que l'dvdne-
ment arrive .... "
3. Unhappily, however, there is no. agreement to this effect among the French.
Even as sound a scholar as Planiol takes' a contrary view and is then'put to it
to explain transmissibility prior to the happening of the condition, and retroactivity.
See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE [AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LouIsi-
ANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE] Nos. 381, 382 (1959). But Colin and Capitant sup-
port the view with ample citation of authority. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET DE LA
MOtANDIARE, TRAIT.. D .DROIT CrVIL No. 653 (12th ed. 1953).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2041 (1870)..
5. Id. art. 3301.
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ures.6 Yet they are conditional and not absolute or unconditional
rights. This means that the duty to proceed with performance is
suspended pending the occurrence of the condition and there can
be no breach in the meantime although, by preventing fulfill-
ment of the condition, a party may render his duty absolute.7
Applied to the instant facts, when Zemurray in return for $500
gave Creole the right to buy the land in question within two years,
a unilateral contract was created and Zemurray came under a
duty to convey the property to Creole. But this duty was subject
to two conditions - (1) the payment by Creole of the third par-
ty's note within five months and (2) the notification of Zemur-
ray by Creole in writing in two years of its intention to exercise
the option. Both of these conditions were suspensive under our
law and precedent under the common law. Until they were satis-
fied, the duty of conveyance assumed by Zemurray would not be-
come immediately performable. Creole did not promise to pay
the note in question any more than it promised to exercise the
option. Its irrevocable power to exercise the option, or, put an-
other way, its conditional right to demand a conveyance, was
subject to the payment by it of the note within the time allowed.
Since it at no time made a promise to pay the note, a putting in
default which constitutes a demand that a party perform as he
has agreed would be wholly inappropriate. The writer believes
that a putting in default should properly be required only as a
means of fixing the time beyond which delay damages may ac-
crue,8 yet if it be granted that a putting in default is a prerequi-
site to the resolution of a contract, this means only that a de-
mand that a promised performance be rendered must be made
before the aggrieved party may sue to resolve the contract be-
cause of nonperformance. The resolutory condition is implied
in all "commutative" contracts and is to take effect in case either
of the parties does not comply "with his engagements." 9 But
here there was no engagement or obligation on the part of Cre-
ole to pay the note, inasmuch as Creole did not promise to pay
it. Finally, the time within which an option is to be exercised is
treated properly as of the essence, that is, as a matter of vital
importance. Time is what is being bought, and a person who
pays for ninety days is not entitled to get more than ninety. Con-
6. Id. art. 2042.
7. Id. art. 2040.
8. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-
Sale, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 242, 245 (1956).
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2046 (1870).
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sequently, if the option is not exercised within the time allowed,
it lapses. If the right is further conditioned on the performance
of another act within a shorter period of time, this period may
be as much of the essence as the term of the option. In any event,
the failure of Creole to pay on time was held fatal, which is what
should have been the case in the absence of an estoppel. And the
court found the plaintiff not estopped.
The case of Blevins v. Manufacturer's Record Publishing
Co.,10 which involved the ownership of three tracts of land,
turned in the final analysis on the question of whether or not a
certain correction deed was ambiguous. The court concluded that
it was not and therefore refused to admit parol evidence offered
by the defendant to explain its meaning. A note which has ap-
peared elsewhere in this journal" explores the question of
whether, from the standpoint of the laws relating to registry
and the admissibility of parol evidence there is or should be a
difference between a case where a person's own deed puts him
on notice, by way of an exception, of a previously recorded con-
veyance of a portion of the property, and a case where he has no
such notice although there is of record a prior recorded convey-
ance of the property he buys, the description of which is inade-
quate to enable him to determine the fact.
An adequate consideration of the problem involved in Haeu-
ser v. Castrogiovanni2 would exceed the space limitations for
this sort of review. It was held that an option holder is pre-
sumed to be making a deposit of earnest money when, on taking
up his option, he pays a portion of the purchase price, as re-
quired. Suffice it here to say that this appears to be consistent
with the principle often stated in the cases that any payment of
money in connection with a contract to sell an immovable is
earnest money in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary.
Under the established jurisprudence the exercise of an option
gives rise to a contract to sell which will later ripen into a sale
upon the delivery of an act translative of title. The trouble lies
not in this case, or the court's disposition thereof, but in the
existing presumption.
A limitation of the public records doctrine discoverable in the
language of McDuffie v. Walker1 3 was applied in Broussard v.
10. 235 La. 708, 105 So.2d 392 (1958).
11. Note, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 178 (1959).
12. 235 La. 909, 106 So.2d 306 (1958).
13. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
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DoucetM4 and a transfer of real estate by way of exchange, where
a donation was intended, was annulled as in violation of Article
1497 of the Civil Code even with respect to a vendee of the trans-
feree. In McDuffie v. Walker the court explained that a person
cannot be charged with fraud simply because he ignores what
the law provides is as to him utterly null and void. But the third
party here was not in this category. Quite to the contrary he
was found to have been an active participant in a scheme to ac-
quire the plaintiff's sole means of support for personal profit
without giving an equivalent in return. The basic principle ap-
plied, was that fraud vitiates all things.
In remanding the purchaser's suit for a reduction in the pur-
chase price of a house because of certain defects, the evidence
having been found insufficient to prove the cost of the necessary
remedial work, the court, in Lemonier v. Coco,15 instructed the
trial judge to take into consideration that during the appeal the
plaintiff had sold the house for a sum in excess of the purchase
price. The opinion cautioned that this evidence was to be con-
sidered together with all the other available evidence with a
view to determining the difference, at the time of the sale,
between the value of the thing sold in its defective condition and
its value as warranted. This test is in keeping with the usual
statement of the rule.' 6 A similar measure is applied when the
buyer is given the cost of remedying the defects in the absence
of evidence of the sound value of the thing. That is to say, with-
out regard to what he paid for the thing, he gets what it would
have been worth if it had been sound. Actually, such a measure
seems to give him the benefit of his bargain, which is the meas-
ure of damages for breach of contract. It puts the buyer in as
good a position as he would have been in if the contract had been
performed. But when redhibition is allowed, the buyer can re-
cover against the good faith seller only the purchase price plus
his out-of-pocket expenses, i.e., the expenses of the sale. Since he
is not entitled. to damages, the recovery is not designed to put
him in as good a position as he would have been in if the contract
had been performed. His recovery is based on what he paid, not
14. 236 La. 217, 107 So.2d 448 (1958).
15. 237 La. 760, 112 So.2d 436 (1959).
16. Foster & Co. v. Baer & Co., 7 La. Ann. 613 (1852) ("If for example,
the difference of value on the day 'of sale was 20 per cent, Baer & Co. would
be entitled to a deduction of twenty per cent from the price they paid, assuming
the price was the fair market value, at the time, of a sound article"). See also
Iberia Cypress Co. v. Von Schoeler, 121 La. 72, 46 So. 105 (1908).
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the actual value of a sound article; it does not include the differ-
ence, if any, between the contract and market prices. To' illus-'
trate, if the price paid for a thing is $100, although its market
value is $125, the buyer is entitled upon a rescission of the 'sale
for redhibitory defects, pretermitting expenses, to a return of
only $100. On the contrary, if he should be given a sum suffi-
cient to remedy the defects, he would come out with property
worth $125. Again, if instead of allowing him the cost of rem-
edying the defects, he is given the difference between the thing
in its defective condition and its value as a sound article, he
would be compensated on the basis of a thing worth $125. Either
of these measures, therefore, seems to give him the benefit of
his bargain, which is another way of saying the difference.be-
tween the contract price and market value. Consequently, when
the price paid is lower than the value of the thing as a, sound
article, the buyer would be better off in an action quanti minoris
than in a redhibitory action. This possibility could be avoided
by using the price paid as the ultimate value of the thing instead
of its value as warranted. In the usual case the foregoing consid-
erations would be of no consequence for the simple reason that
the price paid would be the same as the value of the thing as a
sound article. And of course, if the seller should be in bad faith,
the buyer would be entitled to. damages designed to give him the
value of his bargain.
In Falk v. Luke Motor Co. 17 the court reaffirmed its estab-
lished position that an automobile which will not run or which
runs intermittently requiring the frequent attention of a •me-
chanic to keep it going is an abomination, manifestly not fit for
the purpose intended, and the sale thereof is subject to redhibi-
tion. The purchaser was found to have discharged the burden
resting upon him of offering timely to return the vehicle.' It
was found that an express warranty to make all 'adjustments
and improvements necessary to place the car in proper running
condition did not displace the implied warranty governing red-
hibitory defects under Article 2520 of the Civil Code. The opin-
ion places the risk of serious mechanical failure where it prop-
erly belongs - on the seller. It does not disturb the rule reflect-
ed in earlier cases that redhibition is not available where me-
chanical defects in a thing bought can be remedied by adjust-
ments of a kind within the reasonable contemplation of the buy-
17. 237 La. 982, 112 So.2d .683 (1959).
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er. This qualification finds its support in the proposition that
one who buys a complicated piece of machinery should foresee
that some adjustments might have to be made to assure proper
performance and consequently voluntarily assumes such risk.
The existence of redhibitory vices goes to the cause of the
assumption by the buyer of an obligation to pay the price and
consequently constitutes a legal basis for arresting a seizure and
sale under Article 739(3) of the Code of Practice according to
the interpretation given to this provision by the jurisprudence.
This position was reaffirmed in Coco v. Mack Motor Truck
Corp.,' where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the seizure and sale
of certain trucks that he had bought from the defendant and to
obtain instead a cancellation of the sales for redhibitory vices.
The opinion also pointed out that the trial court in decreeing a
reduction in the price should have determined the amount of the
reduction to which the buyer was entitled.
EXPROPRIATION
Most of the cases dealing with the expropriation of private
property for public purposes were concerned with only the
amount of compensation to be paid. An important exception was
the case of State v. Macaluso,'9 which upheld the constitutional-
ity of R.S. 48:441-460 authorizing ex parte expropriations and
immediate possession for highway purposes upon the deposit of
estimated adequate compensation into the registry of the court.
The cases involving a determination of value reflect the well-
established principle that in determining market value, that is,
what a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller, sales of
comparable property constitute the best guide. 20 In this connec-
tion it is appropriate to consider so-called "monopoly sales" to a
person already owning adjacent property.21 In the absence of
satisfactory evidence of comparable sales a determination of
value may be based on the opinions of experts, in which case the
opinion of each should be given effect if it appears to be well
grounded both from the standpoint of sincerity and good sense.22
An application of the income method of evaluation based on rent-
18. 235 La. 1095, 106 So.2d 691 (1958).
19. 235 La. 1019, 106 So.2d 455 (1958).
20. City of Alexandria v. Jones, 236 La. 612, 108 So.2d 528 (1959) ; State
v. Tolmas, 238 La. 1, 113 So.2d 288 (1959).
21. State v. Grand Consistory, 237 La. 1005, 112 So.2d 692 (1959).
22. Shreveport v. Jones, 236 La. 727, 109 So.2d 72 (1959).
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al value is a proper factor.23 And in such cases it is also proper
for the court to appoint an appraiser and for the latter to base
his determination on a capitalization of the net rental income
compared with the estimated reproduction cost.24 A rate of
capitalization of 71/2 % was approved and the court observed that
there is no fixed rule on the point.
In other cases the court rejected the contention that the tak-
ing by the state of a devolutive instead of a suspensive appeal
from a judgment of dismissal destroyed the effectiveness of the
order of expropriation inasmuch as the trial court's judgment
had divested the title of the state.25 The motion to dismiss was
found to be without merit since it was based on an assertion of
the very issue to be determined on the appeal. The only case
finding an appropriation unlawful was that of Board of Com-
missioners for the Pontchartrain Levee District v. Baron.26 This
was based on lack of evidence that the land appropriated for
levee purposes was burdened with a servitude in favor of the
public in keeping with Article 665 of the Civil Code.
LEASE
The Civil Code provides that a lessor is obligated to deliver
the premises to the lessee in good condition and free of the need
of any repairs.2 7 He also guarantees the lessee against any vices
or defects that may prevent the use of the premises, although
he may have no knowledge of them and whether they exist at
the time the lease is entered into or arise thereafter.28 It was
held in Brunies v. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson29 that these
provisions support a cancellation of a lease by the lessee upon the
discovery of structural defects which result in the condemnation
of the premises by the public authorities. To the contention that
the lessee was obliged to suffer the repairs to be made, the court
replied that the necessary remedial work involved reconstruction
and not mere repairs. It was also found that a provision of the
lease contract under which the lessee accepted possession of the
premises in their then condition could not be held to cover vices
23. Efurd v. Shreveport, 235 La. 555, 105 So.2d 219 (1958).
24. Orleans Parish School Boad v. Paternostro, 236 La. 223, 107 So.2d 451
(1958).
25. State v. Sumrall, 237 La. 372, 111 So.2d 313 (1959).
26. 236 La. 846, 109 So.2d 441 (1959).
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2693 (1870).
28. Id. art. 2695.
29. 237 La. 227, 110 So.2d 732 (1959).
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andcdefects so radical as :to justify condemnation. The holding
seems clearly sound. The defects in question existed at the time
the lease wasi entered into and there is no correspondence be-
tween such a situation and one where during the course of the
lease repairs become necessary and cannot be postponed. It is
the latter situation that is dealt with in Civil Code Article 2700.
Surely when the lessor delivers to the lessee premises subject to
defects that prevent their use the lessee should be entitled to
cancellation on the authority of Article 2695 unless he has con-
tractually assumed the risk.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
Suretyship
'The Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act 1 pro-
vides that a person 'who has had an automobile accident not cov'-!
ered by insurance will have his licenses and registration certifi-
cates suspended unless he puts U'p "security." The case of State
v. Ray2 held that the Commissioner may accept a surety bond
signed by private individuals. This interpretation of the statute
is sustained by the court on the basis of an. analysis of several
of its provisions, and in this particular case it resulted in ob-
taining some recovery for the widow and children of the man:
who had been killed by the uninsured driver. If the legislature
feels that private sureties are sufficient protection in such situa-
tions, nothing further need be done; however, if there is any.
question about this, the statutory provisions should be restudied
and amended.
This case also held that individual sureties are liable in ac-
cordance with the responsibility specified in the bond despite
their assertion that (and even if in fact) they had not read the
first page of the document when they appended their signatures
on the second page. In the light of the exceedingly generous atti-
tude of the law towards the gratuitous private surety, this may
seem a little rough on sureties who may have been misled by the
representations of the debtor-driver for whom they were going
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 32:851 (Supp. 1952).
2. 237 La. 599, 111 So.2d 786 (1959). ,
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